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The doctrine announced in Citizens United rendered most efforts to
regulate campaign financing unconstitutional. We argue, however, that the
doctrine allows for a novel approach to the concerns inherent in campaign
financing that does not directly infringe on political speech, because it
operates later in the process, after the election. This approach allows us to
address a broad range of these issues and to do so with legal tools that are
readily available.
We describe two applications of our approach in this Article. First, we
argue that courts should use a modified rational basis review when a law
implicates the interests of a major campaign contributor. The nature of the
inquiry remains the same—the law only needs to serve some public
purpose—but the standard is modified to be less deferential, because the
campaign spending undermines the democratic accountability rationale
behind that deference. Second, we argue that some of the key goals of
campaign finance regulation can be realized through institutional design of
the policymaking process, which has far fewer constitutional limits than
campaign finance regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
In Citizens United v. FEC,1 the Supreme Court announced a very
exacting constitutional standard for any campaign finance regulation,
thereby eliminating the primary tool that had been relied on to cope with the
varied problems caused by money in politics. After Citizens United, any
law that restricts campaign spending must be directed toward a narrowly
construed anticorruption interest that is defined solely in terms of quid pro
quo exchanges of policy for campaign funds. The result of this is that there
is now an array of ways that money influences policymaking that cannot be
addressed or regulated in the conventional way. One of our goals in this
Article is to present a reading of Citizens United that illustrates its limits.
We further argue that Citizens United leaves open the possibility for a
novel approach to managing the pernicious effects of money in politics.
While conventional campaign finance regulation tries to mute the policy
influence of money by reducing the amount used in campaigns, the
approach we advocate here focuses on the policymaking process that
follows the election. Because our “downstream” approach to these issues
entails no restriction on political speech, it is permissible under Citizens
United.
The account of corruption in Citizens United, reaffirmed by McCutcheon
v. FEC,2 excluded any discussion of access, influence, or favoritism
stemming from campaign financing. Moreover, the Court concluded—
apparently as a matter of constitutional law—that independent campaign
expenditures cannot corrupt elected officials where there is no coordination
between the donors3 and the candidate.
A broad reading of Citizens United is at odds with Caperton v. A.T.
Caperton held that
Massey Coal Co.,4 decided that same Term.
independent expenditures could influence an elected judge, requiring
recusal when his benefactor had a stake in the case. Despite there being no
quid pro quo, concerns that the judge would feel beholden to someone who
had been instrumental in getting him elected, or simply the appearance that
the judge was beholden, motivated the Caperton decision. Citizens United
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
3. Here and throughout, we use words like “donor” and “contributor” broadly to
include those who make independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate, either in support
of that candidate or in opposition to her opponents. In light of the current law, independent
expenditures rather than direct contributions will be more central to our discussion.
4. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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also seems at odds with a large body of social science research
demonstrating that policymakers are sensitive to political spending and
highlighting the subtle effects of money in politics.
However, Citizens United should not be read too broadly; it does not
completely prevent courts and lawmakers from addressing a variety of
issues caused by campaign financing, although it does restrict the means
available to do so. We argue that the Court’s narrow understanding of
corruption and the anticorruption interest should be read as a term of art that
designates only this special quid pro quo in cases where speech is limited.
This reading harmonizes Citizens United with Caperton, the social science
literature, and previous holdings of the Court. It also opens the door to our
novel approach to mitigating the effects that money has on policymaking.
In this Article, we describe two specific applications of our approach.
First, we suggest that courts should engage in a modified rational basis
review of policies enacted by elected officials, triggered when the interests
of a major campaign contributor are implicated. On the face of it, this
proposal may appear demanding, as it requires a nonquestion-begging
rubric that distinguishes undue or disproportionate influence arising from
campaign spending and the ordinary practice of politics. Caperton,
however, lists a series of factors for determining when there is a serious risk
that an elected official will be biased in favor of a campaign benefactor, and
that case can be used as a model for a threshold inquiry. If that threshold is
met, then the court should conduct a form of rational basis review—a due
process test which requires there to be a legitimate government interest that
the policy furthers. The key difference between our proposal and ordinary
rational basis review is that the policy would not enjoy the “strong
presumption of validity”5 to which it is usually entitled. That presumption
is based on the belief that the democratic process will correct most policies
that the electorate thinks are not in its interest. When the threshold inquiry–
borrowed from the multifactor test in Caperton—is satisfied, however,
there are good reasons to believe the democratic process is not functioning
well, thereby undermining the rationale for giving the policy a strong
presumption of validity. In such cases, democratic accountability is an
inadequate check, and this should inform the judiciary’s treatment of the
policy. In this way, modified rational basis review captures the principles
of United States v. Carolene Products6—namely, that courts should
intervene when, and only when, the political process has broken down—
and in a way that can be applied relatively easily and consistently by the
courts.
Our second proposal turns to the institutional design of the policymaking
process. While it has long been understood that the details of political
institutions may affect policy outcomes, present-day discussions of
campaign finance regulation rarely, if ever, consider the implications of

5. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993); see also
infra notes 154–60 and accompanying text.
6. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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institutional design. We argue that this omission is an oversight and focus
on two principles of institutional design, the implementation of which can
help achieve the ends of campaign finance regulation, albeit via a different
means. The first of these principles derives from a key Madisonian idea
that a broader basis of political accountability—a larger and more varied
constituency—leads to a greater emphasis on the policies with broader,
more universal appeal and lower chances of policy capture by small, narrow
segments of the electorate. An important implication of this idea is that, at
least with respect to policies that are important and salient to the national
electorate, well-endowed special interests should find it more challenging to
take control of policymaking within presidentially controlled administrative
agencies than within congressional committees. This suggests a special
advantage that executive control of policy has over and above congressional
control. The second principle also relates to the basis of accountability.
While political accountability may, in principle, promote democratic selfgovernment, when some interests are systematically better organized than
others and the policy is not especially important to the public at large, it
also can allow for capture of the policymaking process. In such cases,
institutional design choices that promote agency independence—such as
removal protections—and insulate the agency from political interference
may be particularly attractive bulwarks against moneyed special interests.
Both of these institutional design principles can help diminish the effects of
money on policy outcomes, paralleling campaign finance regulation.
A fundamental aspect of our approach is that it does not entail
overturning or modifying Citizens United, or any of the current campaign
finance jurisprudence. Instead, we take the extant doctrine as given and
base our constructive proposals on well-established legal tools and familiar
practices. The approach we advocate is thus feasible both constitutionally
and practically. Indeed, one of the goals of this Article is to show what can
be done after Citizens United with the legal tools readily available to us.
Furthermore, we argue that, while our institutional proposals and doctrinal
arguments do increase the authority of unelected government actors, they
do not so much constrain democratic self-governance as enable it.7
The balance of this Article consists of five parts. Part I describes the
Supreme Court’s current campaign finance jurisprudence. Part II explains
the limits of this doctrine, showing that it permits creative responses to
campaign financing so long as such responses do not directly infringe on
political speech. This part also discusses the relationship between money
and policymaking. Parts III and IV each present an example of our
downstream, ex post approach to regulating campaign financing: Part III
argues that courts are empowered to address campaign financing through
modified rational basis review, and Part IV outlines the proposals based on
the institutional design of agencies. Finally, Part V evaluates the
consequences of modified rational basis review and our institutional design
ideas with regard to U.S. democracy.
7. See infra Part V.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
In this part, we present the campaign finance doctrine and provide the
necessary background to situate Citizens United and its rationale in context.
First Amendment doctrine holds that the money spent in a campaign is
considered speech.8 So, the resources used in campaigns are equated with
the television ads, et cetera, that they often fund, which implies that they are
“core” political speech9 entitled to very substantial First Amendment
protections.10 As the Supreme Court reiterated:
There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate
in electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a
variety of ways: [t]hey can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to
vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and
contribute to a candidate’s campaign.11

Unlike “time, place, and manner” restrictions on speech, campaign finance
regulation is held to the demanding standard of strict scrutiny,12 which
requires that the law or regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”13
The standard thus consists of two parts. First, there must be a good
reason for the restriction—that is, a problem to be solved; and second, the
solution cannot be over- or underinclusive. The regulation should not, for
example, burden too much other, nonproblematic speech. This is the same
standard used for restrictions of speech that are not deemed content
neutral,14 i.e., when the regulation favors one perspective over another.
While the statement usually is made categorically—all laws that directly
8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Money is property; it is not
speech.”); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 508 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
9. Consider Justice Scalia’s comment in McConnell:
This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the
same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of
restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child
pornography, tobacco advertising, dissemination of illegally intercepted
communications, and sexually explicit cable programming, would smile with favor
upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect:
the right to criticize the government.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976); see also Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (“[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent
application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” (citing Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971))).
11. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014).
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 464 (2007)).
13. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 464.
14. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
530, 540 (1980) (“Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state
action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.”).
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burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny15—the Court has
sometimes explained that the higher standard is justified by the fact that
campaign finance regulations frequently function more like a ban on speech
than a time, place, and manner restriction. Given the complexity of
campaign finance regulation, an individual or entity seeking to participate
in a campaign is often put in the position of consulting Federal Election
Commission (FEC) guidelines (which are themselves often opaque) or else
risk substantial penalties. This puts the FEC in essentially the role of a
censor, issuing licenses determining who can and cannot participate in the
campaign, circumstances that the First Amendment was designed to
avoid.16 The Supreme Court consistently is narrowly divided in these
cases, however, with dissenting opinions disagreeing as to whether the
campaign finance regulation should be treated with the more lenient
standard accorded to content-neutral time, place, and manner of speech
restrictions.17
A. Buckley: Differentiating Between Contributions
and Independent Expenditures
Any discussion of campaign finance jurisprudence properly begins with
Buckley v. Valeo,18 which continues to define the law. Buckley considered
the constitutional implications of the 1974 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 197119 (FECA). Central to Buckley and its
lasting influence is the famous (or infamous) distinction between direct
contributions to a candidate’s campaign and independent expenditures in
favor of that candidate.20
While acknowledging the central role that money plays in enabling
speech, the Court held that contribution limits imposed less of a burden on
speech than expenditure limits did.21 A contribution, to the extent it is
15. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled on other grounds
by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (requiring a compelling state interest to justify the burden
on First Amendment expression); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 658 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (“Although
these requirements do not stifle corporate speech entirely, they do burden expressive
activity . . . . Thus, they must be justified by a compelling state interest.”).
16. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335–36.
17. See, e.g., id. at 393–94 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
419 (“In many ways, then, § 203 [of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002]
functions as a source restriction or a time, place, and manner restriction.”).
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
19. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
20. While an independent expenditure may support a given candidate, the candidate has
had no input in how it is spent. Later decisions have treated expenditures that are
coordinated with the candidate’s campaign as roughly equivalent to a direct contribution,
posing analogous risks of corruption and so could be limited accordingly. See, e.g., FEC v.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 438, 457–61
(2001); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 (“[C]ontrolled or coordinated expenditures are treated as
contributions rather than expenditures under the [Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971].”). When we speak of expenditures, we generally refer to independent ones.
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
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expressive in and of itself, conveys only a very rough message of support.
It expresses a message in favor of the candidate but does not identify which
of her views the contributor endorses or for what reasons. So, the direct
impact of contribution limits on speech—the constraint of this sort of
symbolic expression—is fairly small.22 Further, to the extent that campaign
contributions enable speech by another, FECA’s contribution limit only
burdens the ability to speak by proxy. An individual’s right to speak her
own opinions or on her own behalf is not restricted.23 Speech one step
removed, then, is entitled to less constitutional protection. All told,
contribution limits face a substantial, but not insurmountable, constitutional
burden.
The Court also concluded that FECA’s primary purpose, to limit
corruption or the appearance of corruption, was a sufficiently compelling
government interest to justify the restrictions on speech entailed in
contribution limits. The Court held that contribution limits could be
justified in order to prevent arrangements where large campaign donations
are effectively translated into favorable policies by the newly elected
official:
The increasing importance of the communications media and
sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to effective
campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more
essential ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined.24

FECA’s contribution limits were held to be constitutional based on the
compelling government interest of preventing “buying votes.”25 Moreover,
this compelling government interest extended to preventing the appearance
that these sorts of exchanges were happening: “Of almost equal concern as
the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.”26 So, the anticorruption interest relied on in Buckley can be
thought of as consisting of two closely related parts: (1) avoiding actual
trades of campaign contributions for policy concessions, and (2) avoiding
the appearance of such trades. A similar anticorruption interest had been
relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold statutes banning civil service
employees from participating in political campaigns.27

22. Id. at 20–21.
23. Id. at 21 (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”).
24. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 70.
26. Id. at 27.
27. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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The anticorruption interest relied on in Buckley is prophylactic.28 The
rationale is not that all substantial contributions are quid pro quo exchanges,
nor that they will appear as such. It would be extremely difficult, though, to
distinguish which contributions were quid pro quo exchanges, or looked
that way, and which were not. A legislator who receives large contributions
from an industry and then sponsors legislation favorable to it might be an
archetypal instance of a quid pro quo, or she might sincerely believe that the
proposed law would benefit her constituency, possibly on the basis of
information not readily available to the general public.29 These motivations
are not mutually exclusive. Policies that benefit the industry might benefit
the legislator’s home district for that very reason, especially if the industry
is a sizable part of the local economy. Laws directly addressing quid pro
quo exchanges, such as a statute outlawing them (basically an analogue to
antibribery statutes), would be extremely difficult to enforce, making some
form of campaign finance regulation one of the few tools suited to the task.
The government’s anticorruption interest was not deemed sufficient to
justify limits on independent expenditures, though, because the Court held
that expenditure limits entail a greater restraint on speech.30 While
contributions are, at best, a vague message of support from the
contributor—amounting mostly to speech by proxy and therefore entitled to
less First Amendment protection—an independent expenditure is an
instance of direct speech. In addition, the Court held that independent
expenditures do not present the same risks of corruption: “The absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or
his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate,
but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”31 Therefore, Buckley
28. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 n.5 (2000); FEC v. Nat’l Right
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (“Nor will we second-guess a legislative
determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil to be
feared.”); accord FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500
(1985).
29. This is one way the legislator’s choices could very much appear to be a quid pro quo
to the public, while actually being a policy choice that is in the best interests of the public.
This sort of behavior can be contrasted with “pandering,” when a lawmaker enacts policies
she knows (on the basis superior information) are not in the public interest, but that the
public, which lacks specialized information, believes would be better for them. See Brandice
Canes-Wrone, Michael C. Herron & Kenneth W. Shotts, Leadership and Pandering: A
Theory of Executive Policymaking, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 532, 533 (2001); Canice Prendergast,
A Theory of “Yes Men”, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 769–70 (1993).
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45.
31. Id. at 47. This conclusion by the Court is not without its critics, especially in light of
the post-Buckley history. See, e.g., BURT NEUBORNE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM & THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT BUCKLEY V. VALEO 16 (1998),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/f124fc7ebf928fb019_hqm6bn3w0.pdf (stating that the possibility
that independent expenditures may corrupt just as contributions do “is where the Buckley
Court suffers most from having been without a factual record. Enormous independent
expenditures were not part of the fictional record the Court considered, mostly because they
were not yet part of America’s political process. Several scholars, reflecting on the millions
of dollars independently spent in the 1996 elections, have called for a factually based study
of independent expenditures’ potential for corruption”) [https://perma.cc/D3GF-2SR5].
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holds that there are two problems with limiting independent expenditures:
first, they place a greater burden on free speech, and second, the
anticorruption interest does not apply to them. In the Buckley Court’s view,
the same rationale that made limits on campaign contributions
constitutional cannot apply to independent expenditures.32 The observation
that independent expenditures count as a more important and direct form of
speech indicates that even if it were shown that they do facilitate quid pro
quo exchanges, the First Amendment might still disallow limiting them
because the constitutional bar in this instance is higher than it is for
campaign contributions.
Buckley, then, stands for two enduring propositions. First, contributions
and expenditures are treated differently: independent expenditures are
entitled to substantially more constitutional protection than direct
contributions receive. Second, the government has a compelling interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, understood as a trade
of campaign funds for favorable political activity. Although Buckley did
leave open the possibility of other compelling government interests, it
rejected the proposed government interest of equalizing the capacity for all
individuals to engage in political speech, finding it incompatible with the
First Amendment.33 Despite having no shortage of critics,34 the Buckley
framework has proven durable. While a number of justices have expressed
a willingness to abandon the framework,35 especially its distinction between
contributions and independent expenditures,36 it repeatedly has been
reaffirmed.37

32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45.
33. Id. at 48–49.
34. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of
Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 747 (2007) (“[I]t’s hard to think of a line that has been
subjected to more withering criticism over the years than Buckley’s expenditure/contribution
distinction.”).
35. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265–66 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting,
joined by Scalia, J.); id. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced that Buckley’s
holding on expenditures limits is wrong, and that the time has come to overrule it.”); Colo.
Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J. and
Kennedy, J.) (“I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo should be overruled.” (citations
omitted)); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“I would overrule Buckley and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt
some new reform, if, based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is
possible to do so.”); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colo. Republican I), 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
Scalia, J.) (“I would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo.”).
36. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY 363 (3d ed. 2007) (“After Colorado Republican I, there was a clear
majority of votes on the Supreme Court to overturn Buckley.”); Karlan, supra note 34, at 748
(“One thing that [Randall v. Sorrell] showed is that the expenditure/contribution distinction
is now the sick man of constitutional doctrine.”).
37. See, e.g., Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 377; Colo. Republican II, 533 U.S. 431; Austin v.
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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B. Campaign Finance Doctrine Post-Citizens United
Citizens United substantially narrowed the field for constitutionally
permissible campaign finance regulation by reversing a trend toward an
expansive definition of the anticorruption interest endorsed by Buckley and
subsequent cases.38 Although the case’s treatment of corporations—and its
holding that the corporate identity of the speaker does not diminish or alter
its free speech rights39—has received more attention,40 the Court also
adopted a very specific reading of the anticorruption interest and dismissed
other potential compelling state interests that could serve to justify
campaign finance regulation. Put simply, the Court left only one extant
compelling state interest in this context, the anticorruption interest, and
construed it narrowly to include only quid pro quo exchanges.
In doing so, Citizens United explicitly overruled Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce41 and those sections of McConnell v. FEC42 that
relied on it. Austin had upheld a prohibition on independent expenditures
by corporations,43 concluding that the statute was designed to combat
corruption or the appearance of corruption.44 However, the Austin majority
acknowledged that the form of corruption relevant to that case differed from
the sort referenced in Buckley.45 Rather than viewing corruption as a quid
pro quo exchange,46 the corruption identified in Austin was “the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”47
Austin held that this sort of distortion of the political marketplace qualified
38. To be sure, the doctrinal shift in the Citizens United majority did not spring out of
nowhere. The arguments in that case were presented in previous cases, notably Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 291–98 (2003),
overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (Kennedy, J, concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). That opinion, where Justice Kennedy partially
concurred in the judgment and partially dissented, was joined in its entirety by only one
other justice, and two others joined it to some degree. Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The majority in McConnell articulated a quite
different understanding of the anticorruption interest. See infra notes 51–52 and
accompanying text. Citizens United extended this line of reasoning and, crucially, moved it
to the majority of the Court.
39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–43 (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in
determining whether speech is protected.” (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util.
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
40. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html (“The majority is deeply wrong on
the law. Most wrongheaded of all is its insistence that corporations are just like people and
entitled to the same First Amendment rights.”) [https://perma.cc/R7SZ-BLZ5].
41. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
42. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
43. The corporations still could set up Political Action Committees (PACs) in order to
make independent expenditures; they were just barred from using their general funds to do
so. Austin, 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 658–59 (majority opinion).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 659.
47. Id. at 660.

2016]

BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED

2765

as corruption, a judgment Citizens United reversed.48 McConnell,49 which
upheld Congress’s ban on soft money,50 also conceived of corruption in
broad terms, stating bluntly: “[P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too
narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress’[s] legitimate
interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to
curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance
of such influence.’”51 McConnell made it clear that this sort of influence
also constituted corruption and was just as much of a threat to democracy as
the quid pro quo exchanges relied on in Buckley.52
Citizens United, in contrast, defined corruption exclusively in the terms
of the quid pro quo exchanges described in Buckley.53 Special or
disproportionate influence, like the sorts described in Austin and
McConnell, was excluded from this definition of corruption.54 Citing
Buckley, the Court also excluded independent expenditures, concluding that
the anticorruption interest could not be relied on to regulate them.55
McCutcheon followed suit, holding that any campaign finance regulation
must “target . . . a direct exchange of an official act for money.”56 Thus, as
understood by contemporary campaign finance jurisprudence, corruption
involves an “act akin to bribery.”57 Consequently, the Court rejected the
idea that large contributions can be inherently corrupting, arguing that such

48. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (“All speakers, including
individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their
speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”).
49. Parts of McConnell were overruled by Citizens United because they were based on
Austin. Those sections pertained to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA or
“McCain-Feingold”) electioneering communication provisions, not those pertaining to soft
money. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322, 365–66; see also id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (noting that the soft money ban remains in place post-Citizens
United).
50. Soft money generally refers to money given to political parties intended to influence
state or local elections that could then be repurposed to affect federal races in mixed-purpose
activities, such as general party or issue advertisements, or organization efforts that affect
both local and federal campaigns. Prior to BCRA, soft money was a way to work around
campaign finance contribution limits.
51. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United,
558 U.S. 310. Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon likewise casts the anticorruption
interest in comprehensive terms: “The anticorruption interest that drives Congress to
regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than the plurality
acknowledges. It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public governmental
institutions.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466–67 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468–70 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (summarizing these claims).
53. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted); see also FEC v. Nat’l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”).
54. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61.
55. Id. at 357 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
56. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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a definition “dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro
quo corruption articulated in our prior cases.”58
While adopting a narrow reading of the anticorruption interest, Citizens
United simultaneously dismissed other potential compelling government
interests. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti59 had left open the
possibility that protecting shareholders from, in effect, being forced to
subsidize advocacy they might disagree with might serve as a sufficiently
compelling government interest. When a corporation uses its resources in a
campaign, it is using the shareholders’ property to that end. If the
corporation is one designed for express political purposes—such as a
Political Action Committee (PAC)—then the situation is straightforward:
anyone not interested in that organization’s message simply should not
invest in it. The same cannot be assumed for a run of the mill for-profit
corporation with no express political ties.60 Bellotti held that corporate
bylaws and the threat of derivative suits likely would protect shareholders
from having their investments co-opted for stances they found
disagreeable61 and that there was no evidence presented that this risk of
shareholder coercion was real and widespread.62 Citizens United then
altogether foreclosed protecting shareholders in this manner as a compelling
interest because doing so would permit the government to ban the political
speech of media corporations (e.g., newspapers) as well as other kinds of
corporations. The Court also reiterated Bellotti’s conclusion that there were
ways to resolve this issue that did not tread on political speech.63
Post-Citizens United, there exists only one compelling government
interest recognized by the Supreme Court as capable of supporting
conventional, ex ante campaign finance regulation: preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption. The Court in McCutcheon underscored
this holding, stating: “We have consistently rejected attempts to suppress
campaign speech based on other legislative objectives.”64 While it is
possible that other compelling government interests may be recognized in
future cases, at present there is only the anticorruption interest, an interest
that the Court has construed narrowly.
58. Id. at 1460 (majority opinion).
59. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
60. Id. at 804–06 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 794 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at 794 n.34.
63. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010). The Court also held that the
specific statutes in question were not narrowly tailored to this purpose. Id.
64. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014). The opinion of the Court in
McCutcheon was a plurality, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by three other
justices. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but would go further and overrule
Buckley. See id. at 1463–64 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a dissent.
The Court has made this statement in previous cases as well: “We held in Buckley and
reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for
restricting campaign finances.” FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 496–97 (1985); see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
658 (1990) (quoting Nat’l Conservative Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496–97), overruled by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
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Although most commentary has focused on the increased corporate
money that Citizens United has let into campaigns, the doctrinal shift
described in this section is arguably more important.65 We have focused on
it in part because it directly affects future attempts to enact campaign
finance regulation, and also because the impact of Citizens United on the
amount of corporate money allowed into political campaigns is actually
fairly modest. The floodgates that Citizens United opened were already
rather porous. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.66 (WRTL II) already had
cleared the way for corporate money to enter into campaigns by striking
down section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200267
(BCRA), also known as McCain-Feingold, which forbade corporations
from using their general treasury funds (i.e., funds not belonging to the
corporation’s PAC) for “express advocacy” for a candidate in the run-up to
an election, while allowing “issue advocacy,” distinguishing between the
two based on whether a candidate for office was mentioned in the ad.68
Under WRTL II, so long as there is some small amount of ambiguity as to
whether the ad takes a stance on an issue rather than solely on a specific
candidate, the ad is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and cannot be
restricted. The immediate tangible effect that Citizens United had on
corporate money in campaigns per se was simply to allow corporations to
be more blatant about their campaign activities.69
II. THE LIMITS OF CITIZENS UNITED
As we saw in the previous part, Citizens United singles out combating
corruption as the only government interest sufficiently compelling to justify
the restrictions of speech that regulating political spending entails. Further,
it (and McCutcheon following it) defines corruption narrowly as only quid
pro quo exchanges of funds for policy. Other effects of spending money to
help a candidate’s campaign, such as increased access and the opportunity
to lobby her if she wins,70 are excluded from the ambit of corruption.
According to the Court, this definition also implies that independent
expenditures are incapable of corrupting elected officials.
The Court’s treatment of corruption and the closely linked anticorruption
interest raises a number of questions. If read broadly, Citizens United
might suggest that, as a matter of constitutional law, the government only
65. Our approach is not unique. See generally Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign
Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012).
66. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
67. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81.
68. WRTL II struck down section 203 as overbroad, holding that “a court should find
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”
Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2667. The Court explained that safeguarding the
freedom of speech requires standards that “give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather
than stifling speech.” Id.
69. Kang, supra note 65, at 3–4.
70. See Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, Is It Whom You
Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 3885 (2014).
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has authority to regulate activities that facilitate quid pro quo exchanges.
The understanding of corruption stated in Citizens United might, for
instance, prompt a reexamination of the Hatch Act71 (formally known as
“An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities”), which bars
government employees from some sorts of political activity and was
enacted, in part, to “prevent corruption.”72 Along similar lines, by defining
independent expenditures as not corrupting, the Supreme Court seems to
imply that they are not actionable in a crucial, constitutionally relevant
sense. A natural reading of Citizens United is that it says something
fundamental about elected officials, or perhaps how the Constitution sees
them. This image of elected officials and corruption would have a number
of implications for campaign finance law, not the least of which is the
constitutional status of the provisions of BCRA still in place,73 and
potentially extending into other areas of law.
In this part, we explain that such a reading of the case is overbroad. As
we argue in Part II.A, that reading is at odds with the underlying logic of
Caperton, if not precisely with its holding, which was decided only months
before Citizens United with a majority opinion also authored by Justice
Kennedy. Caperton concluded that independent expenditures could, in
some cases, affect the decisions of elected officials. Furthermore, as we
discuss in Part II.B, the social science literature and Supreme Court
precedent show that money can affect policymaking in a variety of ways,
some of them quite subtle. In other words, the quid pro quos focused on in
Citizens United only cover a small portion of the effects of political
spending. The broadest reading of the doctrine in Citizens United would
seem to render all of these campaign financing activities not only
unregulated but also immune to regulation. In Part II.C, we defend a more
circumscribed reading of the case. Citizens United’s narrow definition of
corruption and the anticorruption interest binds only when the challenged
law or policy restricts core, political speech. Regulations that do not limit
speech are not required to be closely tailored to that narrowly defined
government interest and do not have to fit into the small safe harbor
provided for by the First Amendment. Although such regulations face their
own constitutional limits, if they do not conflict with the First Amendment,
then Citizens United’s demanding standard of corruption does not apply.
A. Caperton and Citizens United
In Caperton, a West Virginia jury had found the A.T. Massey Coal
Company and its affiliates liable for $50 million in compensatory and

71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1508 (2000) (covering state and local employees); 5 U.S.C. 7321–
7326 (covering federal employees).
72. See Jason C. Miller, The Unwise and Unconstitutional Hatch Act: Why State and
Local Government Employees Should Be Free to Run for Public Office, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J.
313, 346 (2010) (alteration in original).
73. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 412 & n.22 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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punitive damages.74 West Virginia held its judicial elections before the
case could be heard on appeal, and Don Blankenship, Massey’s Chairman,
Chief Executive Officer, and President, chose to support Brent Benjamin in
his campaign against one of the incumbents on the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, which was set to hear the upcoming appeal.75
Blankenship contributed the $1000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s
campaign committee, nearly $2.5 million to a political organization that
backed Benjamin, and spent over $500,000 in independent expenditures
supporting him as well.76 All told, Blankenship spent approximately $3
million in support of Benjamin.77 To put this figure in context,
Blankenship spent more than all of Benjamin’s other supporters combined,
three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s own election committee,78 and
in excess of $1 million more than both candidates’ campaign committees
combined.79 Benjamin won the election with a 53 percent vote share, or by
about 400,000 votes.80
Massey’s appeal then came before a panel of five justices, and Caperton
moved to disqualify the newly elected Justice Benjamin based on the
conflict of interest caused by Blankenship’s involvement in the campaign.81
This motion was denied, and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed the jury verdict against Massey in a 3-2 decision.82 A closely
divided Supreme Court ruled that Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself
violated due process. The Court held that a judge must be recused if an
average judge in these circumstances likely would be biased.83 The
relevant question is not whether this particular judge was actually biased or
not. The inquiry is more general and abstract:
Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a
probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an
exceptional case. We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—
based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a
personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the
judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The
inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the
total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount
spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the
outcome of the election.84

74. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
75. Id. at 873.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 873–74.
82. Id. at 874.
83. Id. at 881 (“The inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in this position is ‘likely’ to be
neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”).
84. Id. at 884 (citations omitted).
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The Court found that the size of Blankenship’s contributions and their
timing85 was enough to warrant recusal in this case.
Caperton’s “serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and
reasonable perceptions”—looks very similar to the idea of corruption that
has played such a central role in campaign finance jurisprudence.86 As one
opinion puts it: “Corruption is a subversion of the political process.
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office
by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into
their campaigns.”87 This formulation of corruption as being an inducement
to disregard the obligations of their office nearly is identical to the bias
standard relied on in Caperton. Moreover, both standards consider
appearance to be sufficient. The anticorruption interest includes avoiding
the appearance of corruption, whether or not it actually occurs,88 while in
Caperton it does not matter whether the judge in question actually is biased,
but rather whether such a perception is, under the circumstances of the case,
reasonable.
Three other features of Caperton are worth highlighting. First, the risk of
actual bias warranted recusal despite the fact that there was no evidence or
even an allegation of a quid pro quo.89 Second, this recusal was a way of
addressing worries raised from campaign financing that did not involve
Third, Blankenship’s
restricting any protected political speech.90
involvement in the campaign overwhelmingly and almost exclusively
consisted of independent expenditures. Of the $3 million Blankenship
spent supporting Benjamin, a paltry $1000, or less than one-tenth of 1
percent, was in the form of direct contributions. So, Blankenship’s
“extraordinary efforts” to help Benjamin get elected create enough of a
worry that Benjamin would feel a “debt of gratitude” to constitute a due
process violation,91 and these efforts were made up practically entirely of
independent expenditures.
In Citizens United, though, independent expenditures were held not to
“lead to, or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption,”92 and
consequently they could not be restricted. A broad reading of Citizens
United—one that understands the Court to be saying that nothing other than
quid pro quos are appropriate targets of regulation—cannot be reconciled
with Caperton.
Moreover, Caperton illustrates that independent
expenditures can have tangible effects on elected officials and that the
85. Id. at 886 (“The temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the
justice’s elections, and the pendency of the case is also critical. It was reasonably
foreseeable, when the campaign contributions were made, that the pending case would be
before the newly elected justice.”).
86. Id. at 884.
87. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985);
accord FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 156 (2003) (referring to corruption as “undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).
88. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
89. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.
90. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
91. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882.
92. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
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Constitution at least sometimes permits the government to respond to them.
Indeed, in Caperton that response comes from the courts, an element it
shares in common with the modified rational basis review we argue for in
Part III. Put another way, Caperton indicates that Citizens United’s
doctrine has limits, which we outline in Part II.C below.
B. The Political Economy of Campaign Financing
Earlier Supreme Court cases have found substantial evidence that
campaign funding influences elected officials, even if that influence may
not constitute quid pro quo corruption as understood in Citizens United.
McConnell is a particularly clear example of this: the trial court found that
while there was no evidence of vote buying or bribery, “the evidence
presented in this case convincingly demonstrates that large
contributions . . . provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a
critical ingredient for influencing legislation.”93 Judge Kollar-Kotelly,
citing a lobbyist’s testimony,94 also concluded that an “effective advertising
campaign may have far more effect on a member than a direct campaign
contribution or even a large soft money donation to his or her political
party.”95 So, there was evidence not only that independent expenditures
had an impact on candidates for office, but also evidence that this effect was
large.96 A majority of the Supreme Court also agreed on these points,
concluding that both soft money97 and independent advertising98 bought
those contributing the funds increased access to and influence over elected
officials. These findings of McConnell were not overruled by Citizens
McConnell indicates that any sense that independent
United.99
expenditures have a small or trivial effect over elected officials is mistaken.
Social science research confirms this conclusion and identifies other
ways that money can influence policymaking. Numerous studies have
concluded that campaign contributions lead to a substantial, measurable
effect on the policies enacted,100 suggesting the presence of a market for
93. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of KollarKotelly, J.).
94. Id. at 352 n.126 (per curiam).
95. Id. at 556 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
96. Another member of the panel, Judge Leon, agreed on this point. Id. at 804–05
(opinion of Leon, J.). But see id. at 266 (opinion of Henderson, J.) (“My colleagues’ per
curiam opinion and their other opinions ignore the statute’s transparent infirmity and leave
standing its most pernicious provisions, apparently on the ground that candidate-focused
political speech inevitably ‘corrupts’ the individuals to whom it refers.”); Renne v. Geary,
501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he prospect that voters might be
persuaded by . . . endorsements is not a corruption of the democratic political process; it is
the democratic political process.”).
97. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124–25 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310; see also id. at 130 (citing a Senate Committee report that “concluded
that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government
officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions”); id. at 146.
98. Id. at 128–29.
99. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
100. Jonathan C. Brooks, A. Colin Cameron & Colin A. Carter, Political Action
Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation, 80 AM. J.
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policy in exchange for campaign support.101 Motivated by a desire to
influence policy, sophisticated buyers in this implicit market are looking for
the best bargains102 and make their decisions strategically.103 This should
come as no surprise when those actors are committing considerable
resources to a cause. As the lobbyist quoted above in McConnell testified:
“Sophisticated political donors—particularly lobbyists, PAC directors, and
other political insiders acting on behalf of specific interest groups—are not
in the business of dispensing their money purely on ideological or
charitable grounds. Rather, these political donors typically are trying to
wisely invest their resources to maximize political return.”104
By examining the relationship between a lobbyist’s compensation and
her political connections, Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian
Fons-Rosen conclude that “the fact that firms and interest groups are eager
to hire the services of well-connected individuals suggests that they expect
a return in terms of favorable legislative outcomes.”105 The value that
lobbying firms place on these connections is nontrivial: from their data,
they find that a connection to a serving senator is worth an average of a 24
percent increase in a lobbyist’s pay, or $182,000 per year using the median
revenue in their sample,106 while a connection to a legislator serving on a
powerful committee corresponds to an increase of up to 45 percent of the

AGRIC. ECON. 441 (1998); Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, Is Protection for
Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection, 82 REV.
ECON. & STATS. 139 (2000); Kishore Gawande & Bernard Hoekman, Lobbying and
Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States, 60 INT’L ORG. 527 (2006); Pinelopi
Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,
89 AM. ECON. REV. 1135, 1136, 1140–42 (1999); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman,
Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833 (1994); Rigoberto A. Lopez, Campaign
Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies, 13 ECON. & POL. 257 (2001).
101. Gawande & Bandyopadhyay, supra note 100, at 141–42, 147; Grossman &
Helpman, supra note 100, at 834–35.
102. Gawande & Hoekman, supra note 100, at 540–42.
103. The notion that PACs are sophisticated actors who engage in the political process
seeking various policy goals is widespread. See, e.g., Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman,
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 799–800 (1990).
104. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of KollarKotelly, J.). The key alternative to this investment account of political contributions is that
donors receive some sort of expressive or other immediate benefit from doing so. On that
view, donors give to campaigns not so much to influence outcomes but in order to participate
in politics and that participation is its own reward. See Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de
Figuerido & James M. Snyder, Jr., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003). If that is the motivation for political spending, the implications
would be quite different: deeply unequal political expression is much less of a concern than
grossly unequal influence over policy. As we discuss below, however, different strands of
theoretical and empirical scholarship have offered substantial support for the investment
account, showing that campaign spending is motivated by affecting policy outcomes rather
than by the inherent satisfaction of participating in the political process. Jordi Blanes i Vidal,
Mirko Draca & Christian Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door Lobbyists, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3731,
3746 (2012); Sanford C. Gordon, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Consumption or
Investment? On Motivations for Political Giving, 69 J. POL. 1057 (2007).
105. Blanes i Vidal, Draca & Fons-Rosen, supra note 104.
106. Id. at 3732, 3739–40.
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lobbyist’s pay.107 As sophisticated and politically savvy actors, we would
not expect lobbying firms to be expending large sums of money frivolously.
Indeed, in a competitive marketplace, firms that were so wasteful—by
systematically paying larger salaries on the basis of connections that never
translated into benefits for the firm or its clients—would be put out of
business by more efficient ones.108
Most of the existing studies look at direct contributions to candidates
rather than independent expenditures. There are two natural reasons for
this. First, the environment where independent expenditures could be made
in vast, unlimited quantities is both fairly new and in flux.109 Second, the
data on independent expenditures does not exist in the same readily
available way that data on direct contributions exists.110 Due to reporting
requirements, we have accurate data about who is giving and in what
amounts to campaigns, whereas analogous information about independently
funded ad campaigns in favor of one candidate or another has not been as
readily available to researchers.
Nonetheless, the research cited here should be understood to apply to
both independent expenditures and direct contributions. To be sure,
independent expenditures may be less valuable to a campaign than
contributions: when the campaign itself spends money, it manages the
message, decides how to direct the resources, and so on. From the
candidate’s perspective, each dollar spent in independent expenditures may
be worth less than a dollar given to her campaign. She has more or less
complete control over the latter and supposedly no control over the former.
How much less efficient (again, from the candidate’s perspective)—
whether they are worth ninety cents on the dollar or forty or ten—likely
depends on a number of factors. Crucially, even inefficient campaign
expenditures on a candidate’s behalf are still a net benefit to her. And, they
also are still valuable from the donor’s perspective: despite their relative
inefficiency, they still are purchasing influence over and above what they
could with direct contributions alone because direct contributions are
subject to limits. Even if independent expenditures are worth less than

107. Id. at 3743.
108. Of course, the main targets of lobbying expenditures and beneficiaries of political
contributions are, disproportionally, the incumbents. As scholars of electoral competition
have emphasized, asymmetric ability to raise money and grant favors to interested parties is
a key source of the electoral advantage enjoyed by the incumbents. See, e.g., Scott Ashworth
& Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the
Incumbency Advantage, 70 J. POL. 1006 (2008); Sanford C. Gordon, Gregory Huber &
Dimitri Landa, Challenger Entry and Voter Learning, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (2007);
Sanford C. Gordon & Dimitri Landa, Do the Advantages of Incumbency Advantage
Incumbents?, 71 J. POL. 1481, 1483 (2009).
109. The recent spending bill contains a provision vastly increasing the amount of money
individuals can contribute to campaigns and political parties. See, e.g., Russell Berman, The
Most Corrupting Campaign Finance Provisions Ever Enacted, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/Campaign-Finance-Rider-Hidde-InsideCongress-New-Spending-Bill/383629/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9M-E58N].
110. Although extensive disclosure rules would be constitutional. Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010).
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direct contributions, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, this in no way implies they
are worth nothing. It simply would mean that it takes more dollars in
independent expenditures to achieve the same effects—both in the
campaign and presumably on the politician—as a given direct contribution.
For independent expenditures to be worthless to the parties involved—
and therefore to represent something truly different from direct
contributions—they not only would need to be inefficient, but also to entail
something like a chance of backfiring and becoming a liability to the
campaign. This kind of risk could make independent expenditures a net
loss to the campaign.111 But, if such risk governed the expectations, then
candidates would prefer interest groups not to spend money on their behalf.
Likewise, the donors would oblige as they have no incentive to sabotage
their own preferred candidates. If independent expenditures do, in fact,
operate this way, then an array of sophisticated actors are making
widespread, systematic, repeated, and expensive errors.112 There is simply
no reason to believe this is the case. Independent expenditures have the
same sorts of effects as direct campaign contributions: they both affect
policymaking.
In spite of the large sums expended in this implicit marketplace, the
relationship between campaign financing and policy can be difficult to
detect, as both donors and politicians have incentives to conceal this
relationship.113 To the extent that campaign financing choices aim to get
the elected official to make an unpopular policy choice—and if the policy
were already popular then it would not require much to induce someone to
enact it—then there is every expectation that the voters will punish the
official for it.114 Voters also may punish elected officials who change their
policies to suit their donors because they worry that their interests are being
sacrificed to that end. We should therefore expect subtle, hard-to-detect
behavior, and it is not entirely surprising that some empirical studies have
not documented a robust relationship between campaign contributions and
lawmakers’ actions.115
111. Something like this seems to be what the Buckley Court had in mind, though it
arrived at this conclusion without any specific support in the record. Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
112. The 2012 election cycle saw over $1 billion spent in independent expenditures; $550
million was spent during the 2014 cycle. See Kevin Quealy & Derek Willis, Independent
Spending Totals, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/
independent-expenditures/totals (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/RGU3-PB9A];
Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/94RM-AMFX]; Derek Willis, Outside Groups Set Spending Record in
Midterms, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/
upshot/outside-groups-set-spending-record-in-midterms-.html
[https://perma.cc/J4QWVNVC].
113. See Gordon, Hafer & Landa, supra note 104, at 1058.
114. See Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Corporate Influence and the Regulatory
Mandate, 69 J. POL. 300, 302 (2007); see also Gordon, Hafer & Landa, supra note 104, at
1058 (citing Andrea Prat, Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational
Voters, and Multiple Lobbies, 103 J. ECON. THEORY 162 (2002)).
115. Ansolabehere, de Figuerido & Snyder, Jr., supra note 104.
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The subtle influence of campaign financing can take many forms.
Richard Hall and Frank Wayman116 show that campaign contributions are
able to mobilize support and diminish resistance in committees in relatively
Campaign contributions also can work via the
hidden ways.117
bureaucracy. Legislators can be induced to make “status calls” to
bureaucrats in order to affect how they enforce a law or rule.118 Or, as
Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer describe, campaign contributions119
can be used by a regulated corporation to “flex muscle” by signaling to
bureaucrats that they have the resources and willingness to contest
regulatory actions, thereby increasing the costs of those actions to the
agency.120 In response to a corporation’s credible threat to impose these
steep costs, the agency may prefer to scale back its enforcement against that
corporation, perhaps focusing on targets unable or unwilling to fight back
as aggressively, or even commit its scarce resources to other priorities.121
Neither status calls nor flexing muscle implicate bureaucratic capture in the
traditional sense;122 the industry or interest group in question need not exert
any special influence over the agency.
A version of flexing muscles also can be turned against elected officials
themselves. Substantial campaign expenditures—or other signals that the
firm is capable of making such expenditures—serve as an implicit threat to
elected officials; if incumbents do not behave favorably toward the firm or
interest group, it will divert its political resources to their opponents. The
implicit threat strategy is especially subtle because it does not require any
money to be spent in order to be successful. Rather, it requires only that it
be made clear that the money could and would be spent if the elected
official fails to “play along.” Standing at the ready is sufficient. So, money
116. Hall & Wayman, supra note 103.
117. Id. at 810–13 (describing results in detail).
118. Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F. Timmons, Lobbying
and Taxes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 893, 895 (2009).
119. Campaign contributions are not the only way a corporation can flex its muscles.
Retaining lobbyists would be an alternative. Sanford C. Gordon & Catherine Hafer, Flexing
Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures As Signals to the Bureaucracy, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 245, 247–51 (2005). Other forms of “burning money,” however, do not necessarily
have the same effect as political expenditures. Id. at 256–57.
120. Id. at 246–47. The signaling in the “flexing muscle” account contrasts with the
earlier signaling accounts of lobbying that focused on special interests gaining access to the
incumbents to signal to them some privately known aspect of the political or economic
environment in which the incumbents may be expected to have a policy interest. See, e.g.,
David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25
(1994); David Austen-Smith, Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes,
37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (1993).
121. The deterrence benefit of flexing muscles also is specific to the individual
corporation, providing a means to mitigate collective action problems inherent in lobbying
for favorable policy. Gordon & Hafer, supra note 119, at 300.
122. Bureaucratic capture generally refers to instances where a regulated industry or
interest group can gain control of the agency that is supposed to regulate it and use it for the
industry’s own ends rather than the public good. The canonical cite is George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). For a more recent
overview of the phenomenon, see PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST
INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
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can change the official’s policy choices without there actually being a
transaction of any sort. In fact, the only times we should see any campaign
spending due to an implicit threat, i.e., the threat being executed, is when
someone makes a mistake like underestimating the other party’s
commitment.
After Citizens United, the potential gravity of the threat of substantial
independent expenditures, and thus their potential influence over
policymaking, has been magnified. Unrestricted independent expenditures
offer an easy way for a firm to flex its muscles. Similarly, an interest group
now can threaten lavish spending on ads supporting the electoral opponents
of candidates that adopt unfavorable positions, strategies adopted by the
National Rifle Association and Michael Bloomberg’s Independence USA
Super PAC.123 Such implicit threats are more effective with the unlimited
independent expenditure regime put in place by Citizens United. Limits on
spending or contributions truncate the types of signals interest groups can
send. An interest group that is more committed than the spending limit
would indicate has no easy way to convey that to candidates, making it
harder to communicate its threat. Unlimited expenditures allow for more
determined interest groups to both signal that commitment—that is, to
convey their threat and its seriousness—and to execute that threat more
effectively. The improved clarity of the interest group’s signal makes
mistakes by either party less likely, so we are even less likely to witness an
actual transaction arising from an implicit threat, making the strategy
subtler. Additionally, since this implicit threat strategy now is more likely
to succeed, it is a more valuable strategy for interest groups to pursue,
inducing more of them to adopt it. The likely success of implicit threats
begets more implicit threats.
The studies and holdings cited in this section show that money can have a
substantial effect on policymaking through a variety of mechanisms and not
just the quid pro quo exchanges singled out in Citizens United. There are
good reasons to believe that independent expenditures are an effective tool
for campaign donors to exert influence over policy—indeed, potentially
more effective than direct contributions.124
123. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Bloomberg Plans a $50 Million Challenge to the N.R.A.,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/us/bloomberg-plans-a-50million-challenge-to-the-nra.html [https://perma.cc/2LXM-2HYJ].
124. We have focused the discussion in the preceding section on the direct influence of
money on policymaking. A complementary mechanism, which we abstract away from in
this Article, runs through the selection effects of political competition. A simple way of
making this point is to note that asymmetric political expenditures, including independent
expenditures, create asymmetric access to the voters, skewing political discourse and the
distribution of voter preferences that results from it. A recently proposed alternative to the
signaling account of communication focuses on persuasion through argumentation. See
generally Eric Dickson, Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Learning from Debate:
Institutions and Information, 3 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 449 (2015); Catherine Hafer &
Dimitri Landa, Deliberation As Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech, 19 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 329 (2007); Dimitri Landa, New Behavioral Political Economy,
Argumentation, and Democratic Theory, 24 GOOD SOC’Y 86 (2015). This proposed
alternative to the signaling account points specifically to a variety of welfare effects
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C. Reading Citizens United’s Anticorruption Interest
Citizens United appears to take an unnecessarily naïve view of the sorts
of influence that donors can wield. While the case focuses exclusively on
quid pro quo exchanges, there are myriad ways in which moneyed interests
can shape policy, and these are not confined to direct contributions. We
argue that the strongest reading of Citizens United is that its narrow
definition of corruption and the anticorruption interest is compelled by the
First Amendment.
In essence, the Court is explaining that the
Constitution’s commitment to free speech only allows for limits on political
spending, a form of speech, in those specific cases. Responses to the
broader issues raised by money in politics are constitutionally permissible,
provided those responses do not infringe on speech.
In other words, Citizens United’s use of “corruption” is very much a term
of art. In the context of campaign finance regulation, where free speech is
at issue, the term does not mean the general idea of undue, biased, or
disproportionate influence over an official.125 Instead, “corruption”
designates the specific quid pro quo exchanges identified in Buckley and
again in Citizens United and McCutcheon. Put simply, we argue that when
the Supreme Court’s majority and plurality opinions in these cases use the
term “corruption,” they are best understood as saying “corruption as defined
by Buckley.” While the main dispute within the Court in these cases is the
definition of this term,126 the application of that term (so defined) is
confined to the context of campaign finance; it is not meant to extend to
cases where speech is not directly an issue.
This reading resolves the tension between Caperton and Citizens United.
In distinguishing Caperton from Citizens United, the Supreme Court
focused on the remedy sought by the litigant or lawmakers,127 stating
stemming from the speakers’ asymmetric access to the audience. See Hafer & Landa, supra,
at 347–50.
125. See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 127 (1997).
126. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466–68 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447–48 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 422–24 (2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
127. There are other potential ways to reconcile these cases, such as distinguishing judges
from other elected officials because they are held to a high standard of impartiality. See
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667, 1672 (2015); infra notes 134–38 and
accompanying text (discussing Williams-Yule). So, what amounts to impermissible
favoritism for a judge might be entirely appropriate for another elected official, who is
supposed to be swayed by her constituents. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
While some decisions seem to endorse this logic—notably Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783–84 (2002), and Williams-Yulee—the Supreme Court did not
adopt it in Citizens United. Indeed, Justice Kennedy dissented in Williams-Yulee and wrote a
critical concurrence in White. 536 U.S. at 794 (“Minnesota may choose to have an elected
judiciary . . . . It may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires . . . . What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people hear as they
undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary
judicial officer.”).
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simply that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge must
be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned.”128
While the First Amendment ties lawmakers’ and courts’ hands when it
comes to regulating campaign expenditures, the possibility of regulatory
responses that do not restrict speech remains open. We describe two such
possible responses in Parts III and IV below.
Our approach here follows Justice Kennedy’s lead by looking to the
difference in remedies and the different constitutional principles they
implicate. In Citizens United, concerns about undue influence over
politicians motivated a law that restricted speech—the relevant provisions
of BCRA. However, the Court only recognized one concern that can justify
such a restriction, which it distinguished from the less straightforward
influence arising out of independent expenditures.129 By contrast, in
Caperton, judicial recusal was a readily available and accepted remedy and
one that does not infringe on the First Amendment. Thus, a kind of
worrying influence that did not constitute “corruption,” under the specific
definition used by the Citizens United Court, still could be enough to
prompt official action, just not action that restricts speech. As Justice
Kennedy explained in Citizens United:
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy. If
elected officials succumb to improper influences from independent
expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put
expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern.130

Such concerns could not authorize the rules BCRA put in place—an
unconstitutional remedy because they banned some political speech and
were not tailored to prevent quid pro quo exchanges131—but that does not
prevent alternative forms of regulation.
Our understanding of Citizens United is also more consistent with what
we know about how politicians behave. We characterize the Court’s
definition of corruption as a matter of doctrine, a statement about what the
First Amendment requires rather than about the nature of elected officials
and the institutions they inhabit. Hence, we do not take the Supreme Court
to be concluding, apparently as a matter of law (recall that neither Citizens
United nor McCutcheon developed factual records that undermined
McConnell),132 that independent campaign expenditures cannot affect the
decisions of elected officials. Instead, we take this sort of statement to
mean that those activities do not fall within the category of quid pro quo
exchanges of policy for campaign support that justifies limiting campaign
expenditures, i.e., limiting speech. Other campaign finance activities can
128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
129. But see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 447–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
130. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 399–402 & 400 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1479–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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influence officials and policy, and this influence may amount to a serious
problem, because it undermines democratic accountability and control.
Some statements in the majority opinion of Citizens United do seem to
endorse a broader reading of the case, indicating that independent
expenditures do not, as a rule, sway elected officials.133 That is not part of
Citizens United’s holding, though, and possibly not even an express
conclusion by a majority of the Court. It is, at most, dicta, and we read it as
such.
A more recent Supreme Court decision on judicial politics, WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar,134 does not controvert our reading of the doctrine.
Williams-Yulee considered a First Amendment challenge to a common state
rule135 that barred candidates for judicial office from personally asking for
campaign funds, requiring them to raise money through campaign
committees instead.136 A closely divided Court struck down this restriction
on campaign fundraising. In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
Court, cited a government interest “in preserving public confidence in the
integrity of its judiciary” that “extends beyond its interest in preventing the
appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.”137
According to Williams-Yulee, judges are different from other elected
officials. Elected officials are generally supposed to be responsive to their
supporters and their interests, including and perhaps especially those who
demonstrate the depth of their support through campaign spending. Judges,
on the other hand, are supposed to be impartial and “not [] follow the
preferences of [their] supporters, or provide any special consideration to
[their] campaign donors.”138
While both cases deal with judicial elections, there are important
distinctions between Caperton and Williams-Yulee. The Williams-Yulee
ruling
clearly
exists
on
the contributions
side
of
the
contributions/expenditures divide that has been so crucial to campaign
finance law.
Caperton dealt almost exclusively with independent
expenditures.139 Chief Justice Roberts made it a point to emphasize the
limited scope of the Williams-Yulee ruling.140 An expansive understanding
of Williams-Yulee, and a willingness to extend its logic to even slightly
different contexts, could amount to a major change in the post-Citizens
United campaign finance law; if judges are somehow special, which gives
rise to alternative compelling government interests that are more capacious

133. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“[T]here is only scant evidence that
independent expenditures even ingratiate.” (citing McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176,
555–57 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.))). But see supra notes 93–98
(discussing McConnell).
134. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
135. Id. at 1663.
136. Id. at 1662–63.
137. Id. at 1667.
138. Id.; cf. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct.
at 1681–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1683–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
140. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672; see also id. at 1679–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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than the anticorruption interest as it is currently interpreted, then that raises
the possibility that there might be analogous specialized government
interests that would apply to other elected officials, potentially authorizing a
wider variety of direct campaign finance regulation. This would be a retreat
from Citizens United’s decisively negative treatment of alternative
compelling government interests.141
Such an expansive understanding of Williams-Yulee could represent the
road not taken in Caperton, perhaps because Justice Kennedy consistently
has been critical of this line of reasoning.142 It is, however, orthogonal to
our insights based on Caperton. We draw two main conclusions from that
case. First, Caperton illustrates that the restrictions placed on campaign
finance regulation by the First Amendment only apply when speech is
directly restricted.
Second, Caperton indicates that independent
expenditures can, in and of themselves, be sufficient to justify official
government responses, provided that response does not directly infringe on
speech. At most, a doctrine that uses Williams-Yulee as a jumping-off point
and, crucially, extends it to cases involving independent expenditures,
would allow for an alternative, though not mutually exclusive, way to
address a situation along the lines of the facts in Caperton.
What hinges on our particular reading of the jurisprudence is the
possibility of other ways of managing the disproportionate (and sometimes
troubling) influence that grows out of money in politics. Properly
understood, Citizens United does not foreclose those alternatives, and the
following parts describe two ways of regulating money’s troubling effects
on politics that are permitted by the doctrine.
III. AN AVAILABLE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
TO CAMPAIGN FINANCING
This part is devoted to one means of ameliorating the distortionary
effects of campaign expenditures on policy that is not restricted by Citizens
United: courts could play a more assertive role at the end of the
policymaking process. Existing doctrine empowers courts to engage in a
relatively demanding form of rational basis review when the interests of
some individual or entity that has made substantial contributions to—or
made substantial independent expenditures on behalf of143—the relevant
officials in their last campaigns are implicated. Roughly, we propose
something along the lines of Caperton, substituting tighter judicial scrutiny
of the policy enacted in place of recusal. This scrutiny would not infringe
on any speech rights and consequently would not need to be limited
141. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
142. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1682–83.
143. As throughout, we use terms like “campaign contribution” and “donation” broadly to
encompass direct contributions to candidates, their campaigns, or PACs, and also
independent campaign expenditures that favor a given candidate or hamper her opponent.
So, a corporation that has spent a million dollars on ads railing against Senator Smith should
be understood in this context to have effectively contributed a million dollars to Senator
Smith’s opponent.
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exclusively to cases of quid pro quo exchanges. In turn, this judicial
response is free to address a wider variety of campaign activities than ex
ante campaign finance regulation can, including independent expenditures.
Additionally, it has the virtues of both building closely on existing doctrines
and being readily implementable by courts.
A. What Is Modified Rational Basis Review?
Rational basis review is part of the substantive due process and equal
protection doctrines based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
although it is applied in other contexts as well.144 Substantive due
process145 extends constitutional protection to rights not explicitly listed in
the Bill of Rights,146 including the right to privacy147 and a right to
association distinct from that safeguarded by the First Amendment.148 As
Justice Harlan explained:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the
freedom of speech, press, and religion . . . and so on. It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .149

This proposition also is supported by the Ninth Amendment150 and has been
invoked by courts repeatedly.151
Due process thus contains a prohibition against arbitrary or purposeless
infringements on liberty. Most laws and policies do not infringe on a
144. See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689, 1710–12 (1984). Sunstein argues that there is overlap in the principles behind
the Dormant Commerce, Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, Due Process,
Contract, and Eminent Domain Clauses. Id.
145. The distinction between substantive due process and procedural due process is
analytically useful, but it should not be overread. At bottom, the two ideas are the same,
especially since they share a core, namely that the Constitution protects people from the
arbitrary exercise of government power:
We have emphasized time and again that “[t]he touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, whether the
fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, or in the exercise of power
without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government
objective.”
City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
146. See, e.g., Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990).
147. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
148. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 616–18 (1984).
149. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on
procedural grounds); see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
150. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487–93 (1965) (Goldberg, J, concurring);
Mark A. Racanelli, Reversals: Privacy and the Rehnquist Court, 81 GEO. L.J. 443, 447–49
(1992).
151. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
(collecting cases); Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (collecting cases).
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fundamental right, even one not enumerated in the Constitution. Therefore,
in most cases, all that due process requires is that the law has some means–
end relationship with a government interest: “[T]he guaranty of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”152 So, the
general liberty protections contained in due process apply broadly, but are
not demanding.
The scope of legitimate government interests that can serve as a rational
basis is wide ranging, seemingly reaching the limits of the government’s
police power,153 and the government is given considerable leeway in how it
goes about achieving this purpose.154 In contrast to cases where a more
demanding standard—like strict scrutiny—is applied, under the rational
basis standard, the policy may be underinclusive155 or overinclusive156 with
regard to its purpose. Perhaps most importantly, the policy satisfies the
rational basis standard if it bears a rational relationship to any conceivable
government interest, even one that is offered post hoc,157 and courts
presume that the facts favorable to this explanation existed at the time the
law was enacted.158 All told, then, the rational basis standard is extremely
deferential.159 It is so deferential that it rarely will have an effect; a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose, and one that can be offered
post hoc, is easily identified. While the constitutional requirements of

152. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 510–11.
153. Id. at 537 (“So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence
of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose.”); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
154. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (citing Lindsley, 220 U.S. at
78); accord City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“States are accorded
wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and
rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”).
155. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
156. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
157. See, e.g., Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (identifying maintaining a retirement system as a
legitimate state interest, and noting that only “plausible reasons” for Congress’s actions are
required); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 492–97 (1974); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490 (1955) (citing a number of conclusions the legislature might
have arrived at to justify the legislation); Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 109–10 (“We
would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal
problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York
City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And
nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false . . . . The local authorities
may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not
present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they
use. It would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case.”).
158. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78–79; accord United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153–54 (1938).
159. See, e.g., Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002); KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601 (18th ed. 2013); Sunstein, supra
note 144, at 1697.
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substantive due process exist, they have little bite.160 Usually, these
requirements only matter when a court identifies an important right, such as
privacy, that the policy invades because in those cases, a substantially
stricter standard than rational review applies.161
When campaign spending makes a policy look democratically suspect
(which we will define in more detail below), courts should modify the
rational basis test in one key respect: the review should not be as
deferential. The object of the inquiry remains the same: Is the policy
rationally related to some government purpose, i.e., is it a means by which
that end, at least to some extent, can be realized? But in these special cases,
the statute would not come to the courts “bearing a strong presumption of
validity,”162 and those challenging it would not “have the burden ‘to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’”163 Instead, the
burden of proof would be allocated more evenly. Modified rational basis
review does not operate like strict scrutiny, so the law should not have to be
the best means of achieving its goals. That is, the fit between the law and
its purported purpose need not be perfect; it can be both under- and
overinclusive, just not grossly so. At a certain point, if the policy is a truly
bad fit for its ostensible purpose, then that purpose looks irrelevant or like a
pretext. In short, modified rational basis review is rational basis review, but
the playing field is more level.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,164 a touchstone for the
modern treatment of rational basis review of economic legislation,165 helps
illustrate modified rational basis review in practice. At issue in Lee Optical
was an Oklahoma law that placed a number of restrictions on opticians and
glasses retailers.166 Among other things, the statute barred anyone other
than a “licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist” from fitting or adjusting
glasses frames, and it forbade eyeglass sellers from advertising.167 The trial
court determined that these restrictions were not rationally related to the
law’s goal of providing the people of Oklahoma with the best possible
vision care and, more generally, public health and welfare.168 In
overturning this decision, the Supreme Court held that all that was required

160. This can be contrasted to so-called “rational basis review with bite,” where a court
seems to be applying a stricter standard while purporting to engage in rational basis review.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455, 465–70 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
161. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
162. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 315 (citations omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
164. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
165. Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 856 (2012).
166. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 485–86.
167. Id. at 485, 489–90.
168. Lee Optical of Okla. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 133–34, 140–41 (W.D. Okla.
1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 U.S. at 483.
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is some conceivable, hypothetical reason why the legislature enacted the
policy and then listed some possible candidates using the extremely
deferential standard described above. Modified rational basis review
removes this strong presumption of constitutionality, so the law must be
shown to actually serve some public purpose, basically the standard used by
the lower court in this case. Thus, the government would have to
demonstrate how forbidding anyone other than a licensed optometrist or
ophthalmologist from adjusting glasses promoted eye health, at least to
some degree. If a law like this Oklahoma statute were to be subjected to
modified rational basis review (requiring that the threshold inquiry
discussed in more detail below was satisfied), then, following the lower
court’s analysis, it likely would be struck down. Under the laxer standard
of ordinary rational basis review, however, it was upheld.169
The following scenario, inspired by the facts of Nebbia v. New York170
and Carolene Products, provides another, closer example of modified
rational basis review. Suppose the state of New York banned a milk
substitute constituted from vegetables. Suppose further that the state
legislature is organized into committees that are influential171 and that the
members of the relevant committee received extensive campaign support
from those with an interest in this policy—such as the local dairy industry.
As a first step in this litigation, the plaintiff172 would have to prove that the
relevant legislators did, in fact, receive this campaign support; that the
contributors’ interests are implicated by this law; and that the contributions
were substantial enough to warrant the reasonable inference that the
legislators might be beholden to these interested parties.
These elements make up what can be thought of as the plaintiffs’ prima
facie case for modified rational basis review.173 Then, proponents of the
law have to identify its rational basis. Carolene Products applied rational
basis review to a federal statute very similar to this milk substitute
hypothetical. In the course of doing so, the Court cited evidence from
congressional hearings and other sources that the banned products were a
danger to public health because they lacked nutrients, and consumers
tended to substitute the cheaper, though less nutritional, substitutes for
actual milk products.174 Preventing this from happening was held to be a
169. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 491.
170. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
171. One way that committees often exert considerable influence over lawmaking is
through agenda-setting power. The classic model of agenda-setting power is contained in
Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas,
and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE, no. 4, 1978, at 27.
172. As in all civil litigation, the plaintiff would also have to establish standing. This
would not be difficult here if the plaintiff was, for example, a shop owner who wanted to
stock the forbidden product. This was the case in both Nebbia and Carolene Products,
where the ones challenging the laws’ constitutionality were sellers who allegedly had
violated them and were therefore subject to punishment.
173. Since the law in this scenario and in Lee Optical imposed some restraint, barring
people from a commercial activity they were previously free to pursue, it was already subject
to ordinary rational basis review.
174. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148–50, 149 n.2, 150 n.3 (1938).
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legitimate public purpose, as it is connected to public health and welfare,
and banning these products was a means rationally related to that end, so
the law was upheld. That sort of evidence also would satisfy modified
rational basis review. This example also highlights that modified rational
basis review does not require that the particular law be the best means to an
end. There may be substantial trade offs: it might be the case that the milk
substitute, because it was cheaper, was valuable to poorer consumers
because it gave them some access to dairy products—substitute milk might
have been better than no milk at all. But, the rational basis review standard,
even in modified form, does not necessitate that the challenged policy is the
best or most efficient means to achieving its end.
B. The Threshold Question: When Should Courts Engage
in Modified Rational Basis Review?
We now return to the question of when courts should engage in modified
rational basis review. Under what circumstances is this review warranted?
This is a complicated question. The problem lies in defining a baseline
against which we can verify what counts as “disproportionate” or “undue”
influence that campaign money is buying.175 Put another way, how do we
distinguish between an instance of subversion of the political process and
that process working as intended? Absent a compelling answer to this
question, we run the risk of punishing affected parties just because they are
good at organizing, passionately committed to their cause, or popular.176
Further, this baseline must be constructed carefully as the definition of
disproportionate influence runs the risk of amounting to policies or interest
groups disfavored by the jurist or commentator.177 We should not smuggle
in assessments of the policies that an interest group advocates when
considering whether the political process has been undermined in the course
of a campaign. This is a challenge whenever the judiciary attempts to curb
undue influence in the political process.178
175. We are, of course, not the first to make this observation. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge,
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31
(1991). Justice Scalia has made a similar point in oral arguments. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 8, Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Nos. 90-757, 90-1032) (question
from Justice Scalia).
176. The balance to be struck here is similar to the one required in antitrust, where a firm
should not be punished simply because it is successful. For Learned Hand’s canonical
statement of this principle, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430
(2d Cir. 1945) (“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins.”). See also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004); United States v. Grinnell, Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570–71 (1966).
177. Elhauge, supra note 175, at 48–49.
178. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Politics Without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980); Sunstein, supra note 144.
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We take Caperton as a blueprint for this threshold inquiry. In Caperton,
the Supreme Court identified a number of factors indicating that an elected
official was beholden to, or would be perceived as being beholden to, a
campaign contributor,179 raising concerns that their decisions might cater to
the contributor’s wishes at the expense of their constituency’s interests or
their personal judgments about the best course of action.180 The key factor
is the size of the campaign contributions relative to the amount of spending
in the campaign, which serves as critical evidence as to whether the
contributions were likely to have a tangible impact on the election and,
through that, on the official’s behavior.181 Other factors include the timing
of the contributions, the stake the contributor has in the policy at hand, and
any other evidence that would indicate that the contributions had a
substantial effect on the outcome of the election.182 Following Caperton,
modified rational basis review would be triggered when the contributions
were relatively large, the election was close, and the issue was raised soon
after the election or perhaps immediately preceding a new one. As
emphasized by Caperton, these factors are all objective: there is no inquiry
into whether the policymaker was actually swayed by the campaign
contributions.183 This approach also makes sense for our proposal, as
guarding against the appearance that the democratic process has been
subverted by campaign financing consistently has been considered an
important goal in and of itself.
As a practical matter, this analysis is complicated by the fact that many
policies are enacted by multimember bodies. The decision leading to
Caperton was made by a panel (and the judge who ultimately had to recuse
himself was the decisive vote).184 In order to trigger the review we describe
in this section, litigants should be obliged to show that a pivotal or
influential policymaker was affected. In a 75-25 vote on a policy, showing
that a single legislator was potentially influenced by campaign contributions
does not, on its own, indicate that the ultimate policy choice was affected.
Committee chairs, drafters of bills, and officials who can serve as
gatekeepers also would be important to consider as they can all
substantially affect the policies enacted.
Also, this threshold inquiry would be aided by clear, transparent, and
easily enforceable disclosure rules relating to campaign financing, including
independent expenditures. Eight justices wrote in favor of a disclosure
regime in Citizens United, explaining that disclosure requirements impose
very little on speech, highlighting the benefits of disclosing who was
speaking in support of a candidate and citing a governmental interest in

179. We use the term contributor in this discussion for ease of reference. The campaign
support at issue in Caperton was almost entirely through independent expenditures. See
supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
181. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 885.
184. Id. at 874–75.
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providing the electorate with information about the sources of campaign
spending.185
Returning to our ban on milk substitutes example, we stated that the New
York legislature had powerful committees. Suppose a majority of the
members sitting on the relevant committee had received campaign support
in the form of independent expenditures from the dairy industry. The dairy
industry’s interests are obviously implicated by this law, so the question
before the court would be whether that support was enough to make those
legislators sufficiently beholden to the industry. Following Caperton, the
court would look at the magnitude of the expenditures, how close the
election was, and so on. If the dairy industry’s expenditures were relatively
small and officials won their elections by landslides, indicating that they did
not really need the industry’s support anyway, and are thus unlikely to feel
beholden to it, then the threshold has not been met and the modified rational
basis review ends here. In contrast to the above hypothetical, in Caperton,
Blankenship’s expenditures dwarfed everyone else’s, and the election was
fairly close. In circumstances similar to those in Caperton, the court would
proceed to the modified rational basis review outlined above.
It is worth noting that Caperton was also a due process case,186 and this
Article suggests importing that case’s analysis of the facts into a slightly
different context. Caperton provides a method for determining when an
elected official is considered biased in favor of, or unduly beholden to, a
campaign contributor.187 In that case, after finding that the elected judge
was so beholden, the Supreme Court ruled that due process required the
judge’s recusal. We propose to make use of the first part of Caperton, the
grounds for finding bias or its appearance, in a broader context of elected
officials generally. Our suggestion also is consistent with Citizens United’s
treatment of Caperton: the majority opinion in Citizens United did not hold
that under facts similar to Caperton, an elected official would not be
influenced by the campaign expenditures. Instead, the Court explained that
such a finding could not justify restricting independent campaign
expenditures. It was the proposed remedy that was the problem, not
inferences about the official’s behavior or motivations.
Before turning to institutional design, two further features of this judicial
response to campaign financing are worth highlighting. First, modified
rational basis review not only builds on existing doctrines, it is also
practically achievable. In practice, modified rational basis review bears a
more than passing resemblance to hard look review,188 where courts

185. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010).
186. In Caperton, the Supreme Court did not clearly distinguish substantive due process
from procedural due process. Although this distinction is, in some sense, unnecessary. See
supra note 145.
187. See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
188. For explanations of hard look review and the standard it uses, see Motor Vehicle
Manufactures Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See also
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN L. REV. 363,
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examine an agency’s policy choice to determine whether it was “arbitrary,
capricious,” or “an abuse of discretion.”189 Modified rational basis review
works along the same lines, with a legitimate state interest standing in as an
analogue to the statutory directives and boundaries to which an agency is
subject. In a sense, this similarity is unsurprising. Hard look review’s
purpose is to respond to worries arising from the concentration of power in
the hands of unelected bureaucrats.190 In the cases where modified rational
basis review is warranted, there is evidence that elected officials are
likewise not being held accountable to voters. So, despite being formally
elected, those officials are in a position similar to that of bureaucrats. Both
rational basis review and hard look review are familiar judicial practices, so
modified rational basis review will not be difficult for courts to implement.
Second, modified rational basis review has the potential for a wideranging, subtle effect beyond striking down specific policies. As detailed
above, those spending money in campaigns are doing so for a reason: they
seek favorable policies.191 If campaign donors know that the policies they
are trying to “buy” have a higher likelihood of being struck down, that
reduces the value of those policies to the potential donors. If Blankenship
had known that Benjamin would have to recuse himself from the case, that
may have affected his decision to commit funds to the West Virginia
judicial race. In this way, modified rational basis review has the potential
to inject some discipline into the effective “market” for campaign
financing.192

387–88 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to “Hard Look” Review,
1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 539.
189. The hard look doctrine originally consisted of making sure the agency itself had
taken a “hard look” at the issue and given its rigorous consideration. See, e.g., Greater Bos.
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971); Harold Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 181. Later, the doctrine evolved whereby the courts themselves
taking the hard look.
The distinction between these two hard looks may be a bit artificial, though. How else
would an agency demonstrate that it had been thorough in its investigation other than by
creating a record that shows what evidence and considerations led to its decision? Once the
agency is presenting such a record to a court, and explaining how the evidence supports its
position, it is engaged in a process very similar to the current hard look review practice. It
will be arguing to the court that its choice was a good (or reasonable, etc.) one on the basis
of this evidence.
190. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 189, at 198–99.
191. See supra Part II.B.
192. In an influential article, Issacharoff and Karlan argue that campaign finance
regulation simply squeezes campaign funds into the (relatively) unregulated venue. Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1705 (1999). Unlike the campaign finance regulations Issacharoff and Karlan consider,
however, the market effect of modified rational basis review does not try to block campaign
spending, which would simply encourage sophisticated parties to look for ways around the
restrictions. Id. at 1722. It instead affects the incentives, and therefore the willingness, of
potential donors to spend money on campaigns in the first place. The “hydraulic” property
that Issacharoff and Karlan identify, thus, does not clearly apply to our different approach.
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IV. AGENCY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Elements of institutional structure—who reports to whom, who has the
final say over the budget, what enforcement powers are available to various
political principals—determines who exercises influence over the
institution, potentially empowering one set of interests and disempowering
others. Procedural requirements, such as the burden of proof necessary for
official action,193 impact statements requiring policymakers to take into
account a specific interest and alert that interest to policies it might care
about,194 and many others often have asymmetric effects as well, favoring
some interests rather than others.195 Institutional features can be selected to
limit the potential for undue influence of money over policy, thereby
reducing the capacity for moneyed interest groups to promote the policies
they, rather than the voters, prefer. In this part, we describe two principles
of institutional design that can advance this goal: delegating policymaking
responsibility to elected officials with a broader constituency and delegating
policymaking to insulated agencies. Applied to different policy areas, these
institutional solutions can help diminish the effects of money on policy
outcomes.
By controlling who an agency is most responsive to, institutional design
closely parallels campaign finance regulation. Consider, as a hypothetical,
the consequences of a strict limit on both campaign contributions and
independent expenditures—a scheme that would, of course, be
unconstitutional.
Such a limit would lead politicians to cultivate
relationships with diffuse, populous interest groups, dampening the
influence of better-funded but smaller ones. In effect, the campaign
financing rule would prevent those latter type of groups from bringing their
greater resources (or their greater willingness to use what resources they
have) to bear. Institutional design can bring about similar consequences,
effectively substituting for the campaign finance regulation. Roughly
speaking, by influencing the definition of the effective “constituency,” both
institutional design and campaign finance regulation affect the mapping
from interest group characteristics (size, resources, organization, etc.) to
influence over policy. This general intuition is applicable to a broad range
of policy areas and contexts and is at the core of our institutional approach
to campaign finance regulation.

193. Jeffrey S. Hill & James E. Brazier, Constraining Administrative Decisions: A
Critical Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 386
(1991) (citing the Motor Carrier Act of 1980).
194. There are impact statement rules requiring agencies to assess the effects of the
proposed regulation on, inter alia, the environment, small businesses, families, foreign trade,
and federalism. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400–07 (1992).
195. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About
Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63 (1995); Hill & Brazier, supra note
193, at 385–87; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON & ORG. 243 (1987).
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In the modern American government, executive agencies are responsible
for a considerable share of policymaking.196 In addition to the parties and
interest groups they interact with directly, agencies must also be concerned
about their political principals, which possess an array of mechanisms to
control agencies.197 Interest groups can and do pressure agencies indirectly
through those officials; influence over the right politicians translates into
influence over the agency.198 The decision to delegate an issue to an
executive agency alters its effective constituency and can reduce the
influence of campaign financing and other forms of political spending over
it by changing the relevant set of political principals. Specifically,
delegating to an executive agency moves the issue from Congress’s direct
control to the Executive, which diminishes the sway that a particular group
of legislators have over it.
By serving as both experts and gatekeepers,199 the members of the
relevant congressional committees exercise considerable power over what
Congress does. In practice, the political principals most important to the
agency are frequently not Congress as a whole, but a handful of key
members.
Furthermore, committee memberships are not assigned
randomly; they will be most valuable to legislators that have a distinct stake
in the issue—a member of the House representing Detroit will have a keen
interest in policies affecting the automotive industry—so legislators with
distinct biases will self-select into the relevant committees.200 Direct
congressional control over an issue often amounts to control by a limited
number of legislators with relatively small constituencies and who are tied
to specific interests.
The President, on the other hand, has a broad, nationwide constituency,
which makes it more difficult for a single interest group to control policy.
196. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 5 (2001). As
Cornelius Kerwin, Scott Furlong, and William West note,
Virtually no statute of significance can be implemented as written by the agency
receiving its authority . . . . Congress produces statutes that are incomplete and/or
imprecise. . . . [T]hey [then] delegate to agencies the immense task of turning the
general goals and objectives contained in legislation that provide the true
architecture of contemporary public programs . . . . The collective impact of rules
constitutes nothing less than the operational definition of public policy.
Cornelius Kerwin, Scott Furlong & William West, Interest Groups, Rulemaking and
American Bureaucracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 601
(Robert F. Durant ed., 2012).
197. Nicholas Almendares, Blame-Shifting, Judicial Review, and Public Welfare, 27 J.L.
& POL. 239, 267–72 (2012).
198. McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 195; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
199. Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner & Jeffrey C. Talbert, The Destruction of
Issue Monopolies in Congress, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 658–59 (1993).
200. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory
Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102–03, 102
n.1 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1341–43 (1994); Weingast & Moran, supra
note 197, at 788–92.
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Such a constituency is likely to encompass a variety of competing interest
groups, and when the relevant issue is one of importance for a large group
of voters—potentially important enough to determine how they cast their
votes in the next election—the policy that a candidate with that
constituency will endorse naturally is constrained to follow the interests of a
large set of voters. Thus, the interest groups must vie for broad support
among the voters, either by moderating their policy demands or by
attempting to persuade voters that the policy they favor is, in fact, the best
one. In this way, delegation to an executive agency trades the discretion of
a small set of particular legislators, each of whom has a substantial
likelihood of being biased toward an interest group, for that of the
Executive who has to balance disparate interests to form a platform
acceptable to a broad cross section of voters. To put it differently, a broader
and more diverse constituency implies greater prominence for policies with
more universalistic appeal and lower likelihood of policy capture by narrow
interests. This formulation harkens back to James Madison’s key argument
in The Federalist Papers in favor of a large republic;201 although that
argument has received little or no systematic attention in the very extensive
recent literature on institutional design of policymaking, it expresses a
powerful idea that is particularly relevant to the post-Citizens United world.
Similar, sometimes reinforcing, effects can come from adjusting the
agency’s scope. An agency tied to a single industry will develop a stake in
that industry’s welfare. The agency’s funding, prestige, and very existence
would be tied to the industry’s.202 Making the agency responsible for a
number of different industries—especially if they compete—counteracts
these tendencies, leading to results analogous to those of a diverse
constituency.
Implementing the Madisonian strategy with these aspects of institutional
design helps prevent situations like Caperton, where a campaign
contributor’s interests displace those of the majority of voters. Were an
organized interest group to emerge, the Madisonian strategy helps ensure
that any policy that ends up being responsive, if policy is responsive to the
interest’s demands, also enjoys widespread support from the voters.
The second major application of institutional design we focus on here
involves insulating agencies from political control. The typical means of
doing so is to make the agency “independent” by restricting the President’s
power to remove the agency’s leadership without a specified and delimited
cause, typically “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”203

201. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
202. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 96 (1992).
203. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 787 (2013) (quoting Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch.
104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383). These terms remain somewhat ambiguous, as their precise
meanings have not been ruled on. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 110 (1994). There also is some variation in the
statutes protecting agency heads from at-will removal. Datla & Revesz, supra, at 787–88.
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Properly understood, though, removal protections are but one, if a central,
element of a bundle of institutional features that jointly amount to agency
independence. In that sense, independence also is a matter of degree—
agencies are more or less independent depending on which and how many
of those institutional features they have. A more general understanding of
agency independence is important for our purposes as we mean to focus on
institutional features that insulate agencies from interference in policy
choices from both the executive branch and the legislature.204
Among the features of agency independence are multimember boards,
which, when combined with removal protection and staggered terms, make
an agency more independent because an administration will only be able to
replace the agency’s leadership gradually. Independent litigation authority,
so that the agency can sue without relying on the Department of Justice,
increases its autonomy from the Executive.205 Supplying an agency with a
separate source of revenue is another important way of fostering its
independence;206 if the agency’s budget requests must go through the
Office of Management and Budget, then that hands the President another
means to influence that agency, and if Congress funds the agency at its
discretion, then it can control its activities.207 Staffing also has an effect:
political appointees offer presidents a way to steer agencies.208 Decreasing
the number of such appointees, and their role within the agency,
correspondingly increases its independence.
It is important to note that the strategy of insulation that could be
implemented with these institutional features and the Madisonian strategy
of broadening the constituency, which we took up first,209 are attractive
under different circumstances. When the policy area is such that relatively
few voters would make it a determining factor of their votes, or where some
interests are naturally and systematically advantaged in organizing
themselves politically, then the electoral constraint on which the
effectiveness of the Madisonian strategy relies may simply not bind those
seeking executive office. It is precisely in those cases, however, that

Identifying independence with protecting agency heads from removal is traced back to
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also Datla & Revesz,
supra, at 775–81; J. Forrester Davison, The Place of the Federal Trade Commission in
Administrative Law, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 287 (1940).
204. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009); Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541,
583 (1994); Easterbrook, supra note 200, at 1341.
205. Datla & Revesz, supra note 203, at 801.
206. Although, in some instances, this can have perverse effects. Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
44–45 (2010).
207. See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency
Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 605 (1989); Weingast & Moran, supra note 197, at 792;
Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 PUB. CHOICE 167, 178
(1988).
208. See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:
POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 7 (Princeton University Press 2008).
209. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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insulation is attractive as a defense against special interests dominating the
policymaking process.
Delegating an issue to a very insulated agency has consequences along
the lines of strict public financing of campaigns, although confined just to
the issues that have been delegated. While strict public financing of
campaigns—including the elimination of independent expenditures in favor
of, or in opposition to, candidates—would not completely prevent interest
groups from deploying their resources to further their preferred political
outcomes,210 it certainly would curtail their influence. Of course, a public
financing regime of this sort would be unconstitutional on a number of
counts.211 Not only would it have to entail a ban on independent
expenditures, an option that Citizens United forecloses,212 but the Supreme
Court has held that contribution limits that are set too low also violate the
Constitution, and strict public funding sets this limit at $0.213
But, agency institutional design choices face little in the way of
constitutional barriers.214 There presently exist numerous independent
agencies, each with several of these institutional features.215 The Federal
Trade Commission and National Labor Relations Board both have removal
protection, multimember leadership boards, and some degree of
independent litigation authority.216 Despite criticisms that independent
agencies exacerbate the bureaucracy’s status as a “headless fourth branch of
government” and do not fit within the separation of powers framework,217
independent agencies have been consistently upheld by the Supreme
Courts have been willing not only to uphold agency
Court.218
210. The interest groups still would be able to “flex muscle,” for instance. See supra notes
119–22 and accompanying text.
211. The Supreme Court upheld a public election financing scheme in Buckley, one that is
still largely in force today. However, that public financing scheme is not compulsory, and
candidates must opt into it. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85–102 (1976). Buckley also held
that the law could not restrict an individual’s expenditures on her own behalf as a candidate
cannot corrupt herself, further undermining any public financing scheme. Id. at 52–54.
212. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text.
213. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
214. Institutional design relating to government institutions, as a whole, can be an entirely
different matter. The main branches of the federal government are set out by the
Constitution and cannot be easily altered. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779 (1995) (holding that state-imposed additional qualifications on serving in Congress, such
as term limits, violated the Constitution); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
(holding that Congress cannot place additional requirements on serving in the legislature
other than those specified in the Constitution). The separation of powers is also a central
part of the institutional design of the federal government.
215. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 203.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (Federal Trade Commission); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012)
(National Labor Relations Board).
217. Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986
DUKE L.J. 779, 779 n.2, 780–84.
218. Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 217 n.2 (“[D]espite their theoretical incongruity,
independent agencies are not going to be judicially invalidated any time soon.”); see also
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935). But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)
(idiosyncratic exception).
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independence, but also to read in removal protections where none were
explicitly stated.219 Delegation to executive agencies, the key element in
the constituency-changing strategy described above, is even more
straightforward. Courts have permitted myriad delegations of authority to
agencies, including delegation of policymaking authority with few
constraints,220 stating, inter alia, that “we have ‘almost never felt qualified
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”221
As a general matter, then, lawmakers enjoy a much freer hand when it
comes to designing agencies as compared to enacting campaign finance
regulation. There do exist some constitutional constraints on agency
institutional design, mostly arising from the separation of powers and
procedural due process. The overarching separation of powers principle is
that while the agencies, as entities created by statute, are empowered by
Congress, the legislature cannot have a hand in how they conduct their
business. That would violate the division of labor between the legislature
and the Executive. Therefore, Congress cannot actively supervise the
agency,222 nor can it appoint the agency’s officers223 or create special
procedures to remove them except for impeachment.224 While Congress
can delegate powers to parts of itself—to congressional committees, for
example—and authorize investigations and other tasks as part of its
legislative function, these delegations cannot expand Congress’s authority.
It cannot engage in tasks entrusted to the executive branch, such as
enforcement powers.225 Other administrative activities that are less
obviously the domain of the executive branch, such as rulemaking or
advisory opinions, also have been placed outside of Congress’s purview.
The Supreme Court has held that while these tasks are not, strictly
speaking, enforcement activities, they are close enough to make them
executive responsibilities and too far from Congress’s legislative duties.226
Agency procedures abide by procedural due process, so adjudications must
be fair and unbiased,227 although an agency can itself investigate claims,
prosecute them, and adjudicate them, provided there is a division of labor
within the agency.228 The due process constraints on agency institutional
219. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 354 (1958); FEC v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 682
(10th Cir. 1988).
220. See, e.g., Almendares, supra note 197; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake,
58 DUKE L.J. 549, 557 (2009).
221. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (citations omitted)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
222. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
223. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124–36 (1976).
224. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
225. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140–41.
226. See id.
227. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975); see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1980).
228. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
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design229 are therefore modest; in the absence of specific evidence that the
adjudication is biased or likely to be biased, courts do not disturb the
agency’s structure on due process grounds.230
In short, the limitations the Constitution places on agency institutional
design are nowhere near as restrictive as those it places on campaign
finance regulation. For the latter, the regulation must be closely tailored to
a compelling government interest, and after Citizens United, the regulation
must address the anticorruption interest as the Court has narrowly defined
it. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has upheld institutional
arrangements that it acknowledged were “unquestionably . . . peculiar,”
explaining that “[o]ur constitutional principles of separated powers are not
violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.”231 Like modified rational
basis review, institutional design is a readily available tool that can be used
to address concerns arising from campaign financing.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
In this part, we step back and address a natural objection to our
constrictive argument: that the proposals for treating the ills of campaign
finance that we are putting forth are undemocratic in the sense that they
hand policymaking over to actors who are not elected or responsive to the
voters. Modified rational basis review authorizes courts to supplant the
choices made by elected officials, though circumscribed by the doctrine,
and some of the institutional design options described above entail taking
policymaking out of the hands of the legislature and giving it over to
agencies that are less responsive to the voters. We address this concern in
this part and argue that it is misplaced.
Concerns about these proposals’ impact on democracy are reasonable,
and, in connection with rational basis review, where such arguments have
been articulated most extensively, it is the principal justification for the
doctrine as it has evolved into its modern form. Rational basis review is
usually extraordinarily deferential. Courts adopt this standard due to
judicial restraint232 and the separation of powers,233 concluding that it is not
the appropriate role of judges to intervene simply when they think a policy
is ill-advised. It is the democratic process that is supposed to correct such
policies, a view that is sometimes read into the Constitution.234 In run-of-

229. Due process places other constraints on agencies. Agencies must, for example,
provide hearings before taking away a protected property interest. See, e.g., Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Here, we are only
concerned with constitutional constraints on the way the agency is organized.
230. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579–80 (1973).
231. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989).
232. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
233. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[I]t is
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement.”); see also id. at 488.
234. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979)); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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the-mill cases, then, “[f]or protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”235
Still, while the concern with the democratic status of our proposals may
be reasonable, it is ultimately misplaced. The argument for this position we
develop here has several elements, some relevant across our proposals,
others more specific to individual details. A key common point of
departure is that in cases where our constructive arguments have the most
impact, there are good reasons to believe that there is a breakdown in the
democratic process. If the required threshold inquiry for modified rational
basis review has been satisfied, then there is evidence that the elected
official is likely to respond to the interests of campaign contributors instead
of her constituents. Likewise, our proposals seek to prevent interest groups
from being able to exercise disproportionate and systematic control over
policymaking (although there are other reasons to design agencies with
those features),236 control that cannot be easily reversed or corrected by a
democratic process. The consequence is that the relevant comparison is not
between a democratic institution237 (such as a legislature) and an
undemocratic one (such as a federal court or independent agency). The
actual comparison is not nearly so straightforward, and in these instances, it
is not clear that the choices of elected officials should automatically be
privileged over those of courts or agencies, for there is something
undemocratic on both sides of the ledger.
This logic—that when the democratic process is not functioning properly
then the usual prohibitions on actions like judicial intervention have less
bite—underwrites Baker v. Carr238 and Carolene Products’ footnote
four.239 The same logic also underwrites modified rational basis review,
and that review is entirely consistent with democracy.
When the democratic process cannot, directly or indirectly, provide an
effective check on the government’s power, courts adopt a more active
stance. One of the clearest statements of this principle was made in Baker
v. Carr, where the Supreme Court opted to wade into the “political thicket”
to rule on a Tennessee state legislature apportionment scheme:

235. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
236. Improving policymaking and encouraging bureaucrats to develop technical expertise
are common reasons. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil
Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 886 (2007);
David E. Lewis, Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Agency
Competence, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 60, 67–68 (2009).
237. We use the term “democratic” loosely here. There are a number of institutional
arrangements that, while responsive to the voters through elections, are nevertheless
undemocratic in some senses. The U.S. Senate, with its uneven representation, is only one
prominent example. We do not make those sorts of distinctions here: a local town hall and
the U.S. Senate both fall under our general heading of “democratic.” And, when we speak of
the democratic process functioning well or poorly, we mean relative to the way the
institution was designed. By way of contrast, the federal judiciary is not designed to be
explicitly responsive to voters.
238. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
239. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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I would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if
there were any other relief available to the people of Tennessee. But the
majority of the people of Tennessee have no “practical opportunities for
exerting their political weight at the polls.” I have searched diligently for
other practical opportunities present under the law. I find none other than
through the federal courts . . . . We therefore must conclude that the
people of Tennessee are stymied . . . without judicial intervention.240

When the usual democratic processes, to which the courts normally would
defer, are defective or unavailable, then courts are willing to intervene as
something of a last resort. Similarly, courts frequently have intervened to
“clear[] the channels” of the democratic process241 and ensure a wellfunctioning democracy.242
These same principles motivate Carolene Products footnote four,243
which also holds that courts should step in when there are defects in the
political process. As one commentator describes Carolene Products: “The
governing principle is that decisions are made by the democratic process.
The Court should intervene only if that process is blocked in some way.”244
Carolene Products established a form of bifurcated review: in ordinary
cases, any legislation is presumed to be constitutional, but when there is a
breakdown in the political process, courts treat the legislation more
critically. Modified rational basis review takes the same approach,
tightening judicial scrutiny when the political process has, to some degree,
failed. The difference between Carolene Products’s bifurcated review and
240. Baker, 369 U.S. at 258–59 (Clark, J., concurring).
241. This phrase comes from Ely. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 74 (1980).
242. For example, “the judiciary has a basic obligation to keep the political process open
and well-functioning.” Miller v. Cunningham, 512 F.3d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 2007); see also
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1973) (discussing vote dilution through multimember
districts); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (forming politically viable parties);
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753–54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguing that systematic frustration of the majority violates the Constitution).
243. The footnote, in its entirety, reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, on interferences with political organizations, as to
prohibition of peaceable assembly.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
244. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1256.
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modified rational basis review is how such democratic failures are
identified (although they are by no means mutually exclusive), and, in this
regard, modified rational basis review has some advantages.
Carolene Products focuses on laws that disadvantage “discrete and
insular minorities” on the theory that they do not have effective recourse to
the political process. Even if the minority takes to the polls, the theory
goes, it could not defeat a law that disadvantages it. This reasoning has
been criticized, though.245 A minority, especially a discrete and insular
one, may have substantial organizational advantages, which translate into
greater success—disproportionate to its modest population—in the political
arena.246 A smaller group will have an easier time overcoming collective
action problems,247 and an insular community may have social institutions
that make information easy to spread.248 A minority voting bloc may also
find itself as pivotal swing voters,249 making it very influential. None of
these factors guarantee that a minority will possess enough influence to see
its preferred policies implemented or protect itself from policies that are to
its disadvantage. A minority may be too small or resource-poor to wield
substantial influence. But, it does indicate that the mapping from “discrete
and insular minority” to “political vulnerability” is imperfect. This, in turn,
means that the standard formulation of Carolene Products requires judges
to be amateur political scientists and evaluate the relative political power of
various groups, a task to which they are not well-suited.250
Modified rational basis review works in a fashion similar to Carolene
Products—courts should presume a policy is constitutional unless the
political process appears to have failed—but does not rely on the
generalizations about minorities in that decision that have drawn criticism.
Rather than the heuristic put forward in Carolene Products, the first step in
modified rational basis review is to determine whether in this particular
case the democratic process is functioning properly. Only after this
245. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985).
246. We should distinguish between a case where a minority is excluded from the
political process and advocacy and one where the minority is at a disadvantage. See id. at
717. We are concerned primarily with the latter here, which is the harder one for courts to
decide whether or not they should intervene. Carolene Products seems to encompass both
possibilities; at the time the opinion was written, there were numerous systematic efforts to
prevent minorities, especially African-Americans, from participating in politics, but the
language of the footnote is cast broadly.
247. The canonical citations for collective action problems are Garret Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), and MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Collective action
problems increase as the relevant population does.
248. See Ackerman, supra note 245, at 724–26.
249. See, e.g., Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, The Determinants of Success of Special
Interests in Redistributive Politics, 58 J. POL. 1132 (1996). Dixit and Londregan explain that
there exist circumstances in which “largesse for some minority interest groups enjoys
bipartisan support—both parties compete for the title of ‘farmers’ best friend’ . . . the net
recipients of redistributive benefits need not constitute a majority of the electorate.” Id. at
1134. They continue: “In fact, the sheer number of members in a group turns out not to
affect the power of the group in the game of redistributive politics.” Id.
250. See Strauss, supra note 244, at 1265–66.
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threshold finding is made would the policy be subject to relatively rigorous
scrutiny. Modified rational basis review is thus in a good position to
deliver on the goals of Carolene Products footnote four, while avoiding
some of the difficulties they have in the implementation. It also is
consistent with Baker v. Carr and similar precedents.
Two additional factors limit modified rational basis review’s
undemocratic consequences. First, while modified rational basis review is,
when it applies, stricter than the usual rational basis standard, it is not
prohibitively so. To survive review, all that needs to exist is some public
purpose that the policy serves. We do not propose to limit the set of
legitimate state interests,251 and a law should not be overturned here just
because a court can conceive of a better or more efficient way to achieve
the law’s stated purpose. That is, the fit between the purpose and the policy
need not be perfect, recognizing that much of public policy is incremental
and the product of compromise. Therefore, the heightened review does not
grant judges license to change policy to suit their own preferences or
conceptions of the good.
Second, the threshold finding that the elected official might be swayed by
campaign funds is fairly demanding. The facts of Caperton were “extreme
by any measure.”252 Blankenship spent more than all of Benjamin’s other
supporters combined, triple the amount that Benjamin’s own campaign
spent, in a close election the results of which would directly affect his
company.253 Under those circumstances, it is easy to conclude that the
possibility that the newly elected Justice Benjamin might be beholden to
Blankenship should be taken seriously. These facts are not necessary to
trigger modified rational basis review—Caperton lays out a series of
factors, not a definitive minimum—but any run-of-the-mill involvement in
a campaign does not suffice. It will take substantial expenditures (relative
to the size of the election), a close contest, and so forth to trigger the stricter
standard of review, and so the first step in this review should screen out
many cases.
Turning to institutional design, the view that a decision by the “people’s
branch” to delegate power to an executive agency harms democracy
presupposes a certain—highly contestable—view of representation. To
start with, the President is, of course, an elected official and both the
executive and the legislative policymaking institutions fit within a broadly
democratic framework. However, the institutions differ in important ways.
While individual legislators are closer to their constituents, and, in that
sense, are more proximate representatives of their interests,254 these
legislators’ official decisions can affect a group much larger than their
electoral constituency: a congressional committee chair can exercise
substantial power in lawmaking that affects voters throughout the nation
while being answerable only to the voters within her own district. While
251.
252.
253.
254.

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009).
See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison).
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Congress, as a whole, has a broad national constituency, a given member of
it does not. In contrast, the President is accountable to a national
constituency and stands more plausibly as a proximate representative of that
broader constituency than any other official.255 Indeed, as we argued
above, it is precisely that difference in constituencies that can make the
office of the President less susceptible to the influence of narrow interests.
Even aside from looking to the policymakers’ immediate constituency,
the assessment of the institutions with respect to their “democraticness” is
probably best pursued at the system level rather than the component
level.256 Thus, for example, in suggesting that agency independence can be
a useful substitute for campaign finance regulation and controlling the
influence of money in politics, we do not mean to imply that it is always, or
necessarily, a good idea—no more than relatively searching judicial review
would be. Both are useful tools in specific circumstances. When
appropriate, they are a means to achieve the public’s goals, despite being
undemocratic in the narrow sense that policy is being made by unelected
actors. In the broader sense, their intent and effect is ultimately democracy
enabling. By mitigating the pathologies of money in politics, these postelectoral mechanisms increase the actual and effective practice of
democratic governance and make politics more responsive to the voters writ
large. And both the Framers of the Constitution257 and the courts258 have
recognized that achieving that goal may involve intervention by less
obviously or directly democratic institutions. There is also some indication
that voters may view such intervention favorably.259
CONCLUSION
Money has the potential to undermine the democratic process by
conferring outsized influence on those willing and able to spend it. At the
same time, attempts to regulate money in politics must be balanced against
255. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985).
256. Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009).
257. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 62, 63 (James Madison).
258. See supra notes 238–42.
259. Voter approval of independent agencies is consistently high, especially when
compared to Congress. The U.S. Postal Service has been ranked one of the best performing
federal agencies, and it has many of the hallmarks of independence. See Jeffrey M. Jones,
Americans’ Ratings of CDC Down After Ebola Crisis, GALLUP (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/179522/americans-ratings-cdc-down-ebola-crisis.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
H3ED-GAHD]; Datla & Revesz, supra note 203, at 786–805. The Postal Service and the
Federal Trade Commission, both independent agencies, also have been rated the most trusted
federal agencies. U.S. Postal Service Tops Ponemon Institute List of Most Trusted Federal
Agencies, PONEMON INST. (June 30, 2010), http://www.ponemon.org/news-2/32
[https://perma.cc/K2CZ-F83Q]. The Federal Reserve has not been viewed as positively, but
still enjoys a 57 percent “favorable” rating by survey respondents (32 percent of respondents
finding it “unfavorable”), compared to the mere 23 percent of respondents who rated
Congress favorably (74 percent unfavorable). Trust in Government Nears Record Low, but
Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-nears-record-low-but-mostfederal-agencies-are-viewed-favorably/ [https://perma.cc/L9X4-6VH5].
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commitments to freedom of speech. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court
made comprehensive campaign finance regulation, at least in its traditional
form, unworkable. Under the current doctrine, the Constitution bars
attempts to effectively keep money out of the electoral system.
Recognizing this doctrine, and its implicit limits, we have proposed an
alternative approach to the issue—mitigating the effects of money in
politics by means that operate later in the policymaking process. In this
Article, we detail two applications of the alternative approach: (1)
modified rational basis review, and (2) the design of policymaking
institutions to be more resilient to the distortions caused by large campaign
expenditures. This downstream approach has three main virtues. First,
because it does not infringe on free speech, it is not unconstitutional.
Second, it relies on legal tools that are already available. Third, and closely
related to the previous point, it is practically achievable. Courts already
possess the means to respond to cases where campaign expenditures
undermine the democratic process, while delivering on the ideals embodied
in decisions like Carolene Products. Furthermore, there is substantial
latitude for choosing the specific features of policymaking institutions,
which can moderate the influence of campaign expenditures on the resulting
policies. In the wake of the restrictions placed on direct regulation of
campaign finance, we should turn our attention to ameliorating the effects
of campaign expenditures on policy rather than eliminating those
constitutionally protected expenditures.

